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20011 SURVEY SECTION 775
Property Law. Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707
(R.I. 2000). A regulatory takings claim is not ripe if the landowner
has never submitted an application specifying the planned devel-
opment of the property. Upon rejection by the state, the landowner
must submit a "less grandiose" plan for development.
FACTS AND TRAVEL
Anthony Palazzolo (Palazzolo) brought an inverse condemna-
tion action against Rhode Island's Coastal Resource Management
Council (CRMC). 1 Palazzolo claimed that CRMC's denial of his ap-
plication to fill eighteen acres of his coastal wetlands constituted a
taking of his property for which just compensation was required
under the United States and Rhode Island Constitutions. 2 Palaz-
zolo was seeking compensation in the amount of $3,150,000. 3 That
amount was based on the profit he stood to gain had he been able
to develop a seventy-four lot subdivision on his property. 4
From 1960 to February 27, 1978, Palazzolo was the president
and sole shareholder of Shore Gardens, Inc. (SGI). 5 During that
time, SGI was the owner of the property in question. On February
27, 1978, SGI's corporate charter was revoked and Palazzolo be-
came the sole owner of the property.6
Between 1962 and 1985, Palazzolo filed several applications
with various state agencies seeking permission to substantially al-
ter his property. 7 On April 1, 1971, the Division of Harbors and
Rivers (DHR) approved Palazzolo's application to dredge the pond
and fill his property so he could construct a beach club.8 On No-
vember 17, 1971, DHR revoked its assent.9 Palazzolo did not ap-
peal this revocation. 10 By 1977, the state's regulatory framework
evolved so that the Coastal Resources Management Council
1. See Palazzolo v. State ex rel. Tavares, 746 A.2d 707, 709 (R.I. 2000).
2. See id. at 711.
3. See id.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 710.
6. See id.
7. See id.
8. See id.
9. See id.
10. See id.
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(CRMC) was the agency responsible for issuing permits for the fill-
ing of coastal wetlands."
In 1983 and 1985, Palazzolo, acting in his own capacity, filed
applications with CRMC to fill his property.12 His 1985 applica-
tion sought permission to construct a beach club.' 3 Both applica-
tions were denied.' 4 Thereafter, Palazzolo filed a regulatory
takings claim against CRMC and the state.' 5 At a jury waived
trial, the trial justice found that Rhode Island's regulatory scheme
did not amount to a taking of Palazzolo's property and that no com-
pensation was required under the Rhode Island or United States
Constitutions.' 6
BACKGROUND
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution pre-
vents states from taking private property without just compensa-
tion. 17 Traditionally, this concept was applied to a physical
intrusion onto, or confiscation of, real property.' However, the
United States Supreme Court has found that a government-im-
posed regulation may rise to a level at which just compensation is
required. 19 This is referred to as a regulatory taking.20
A person seeking compensation for a regulatory taking must
first show that his claim is ripe.2 ' A regulatory takings claim "is
not ripe until the government entity charged with implementing
the regulations has reached a final decision regarding the applica-
tion of the regulations to the property at issue."22
11. Rhode Island's regulatory framework underwent dramatic changes be-
tween 1962 and 1985. See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 710 and accompanying notes.
However, the court found that Mr. Palazzolo could not possibly have owned the
property in his own name until the corporation dissolved in 1978. See id. at 716.
Hence, the relevant law in this case is that which was in place as of Mr. Palazzolo's
acquisition date of February 27, 1978. See id. at 716-17.
12. See Palazzolo, 746 A.2d at 711.
13. See id.
14. See id.
15. See id.
16. See id.
17. See id. at 712.
18. See id.
19. See id.
20. See id.
21. See id.
22. Id. (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton
Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 186 (1985)).
SURVEY SECTION
Upon a showing of ripeness, the court must determine if the
government regulation constitutes a per se taking.23 A per se tak-
ing may occur if a regulation requires any physical invasion of a
property owner's property.24 Alternatively, a per se regulatory
taking may occur if a regulation "denies all economically beneficial
or productive use of land."25
A regulation not amounting to a per se taking may still consti-
tute a regulatory taking for which compensation is required. 26 A
regulation may constitute a regulatory taking if it meets the three-
factor test established in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New
York City.27 Under Penn Central, the first consideration is the
character of the regulation. 28 The second is the economic impact of
the regulation.29 Finally, the trial court should consider the extent
to which the regulation complained of has interfered with the prop-
erty owner's "investment-backed expectations." 30
ANALYSIS AND HOLDING
The Rhode Island Supreme Court reviewed the issue of ripe-
ness de novo.31 The court held that as a matter of law Palazzolo's
claim was not ripe.32 Justice Lederberg referred to two facts to
justify her holding.33 The first concerned the contents of Palaz-
zolo's applications. Palazzolo's 1966 and 1985 applications sought
to fill the wetlands so he could construct a beach club. 34 His 1963
and 1983 applications sought permission to fill the wetlands, but
made no mention of his planned use of the property.3 5 As Palaz-
zolo never submitted an application concerning the development of
the seventy-four lot subdivision that he claims to have had taken
23. See id. (citing Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992)).
24. See id.
25. Id. (quoting Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015).
26. See id at 713 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S.
104, 124 (1978)).
27. See id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
28. See id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
29. See id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
30. Id. (citing Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124).
31. See id. at 714.
32. See id.
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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from him, the state never rendered a "final decision regarding the
application of the regulations to the property at issue."36
The second fact that convinced Justice Lederberg that Palaz-
zolo's claim was not ripe was that he never modified his application
to seek permission for a "less grandiose" plan.37 Palazzolo's 1963
and 1983 applications sought to fill all eighteen acres of his prop-
erty.38 His 1966 and 1985 applications sought to fill all eighteen
acres except a fifty-foot strip between the pond and area of the pro-
posed fill.39 Palazzolo failed to ripen his claim by not seeking to
use the property in a way that would allow him to fill a substan-
tially smaller amount of his property. 40 Additionally, Palazzolo
could have built at least one house on the upland portion of the
land without having to fill any of the property.41
The supreme court's holding that Palazzolo's claim was not
ripe for review disposed of the case. However, in dicta, the court
went on to discuss the merits of Palazzolo's claim.42 The court
stated that even if the claim was ripe, the government's regula-
tions did not constitute a taking for which compensation was
required.43
In its analysis of Palazzolo's claim under a per se takings the-
ory, the court stated that Palazzolo was not deprived of all econom-
ically beneficial use of his property.44 The court relied on the fact
that Palazzolo would have been able to receive up to $200,000 had
he developed the upland portion of his property.45 Although this
was significantly less than the $3,150,000 he stood to gain if he
was permitted to fully develop his property, the fact was that there
was still remaining value in the land.46 Accordingly, Palazzolo
was not deprived of all economically valuable or beneficial use of
his land.47
36. Id. (quoting Williamson County Reg'l Planning Conm'n, 473 U.S. at 186).
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id.
43. See id. at 714-17.
44. See id. at 715.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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Further, the court stated that Palazzolo could not show a per
se taking if he was not the owner of the property at the time the
regulation was passed.4 The court stated that Palazzolo could not
have acquired the property in his name until SGI was dissolved in
1978.49 By that time, regulations limiting his ability to fill the wet-
lands were already in place so he never had the right to fill the
wetlands.50 Hence, nothing had been taken from him.51
The supreme court also found that Palazzolo could not have
prevailed in his takings claim under a Penn Central analysis.52
The court again relied on the fact that Palazzolo was not the owner
of the property until 1978.53 In light of the regulations that were
in place at that time, Palazzolo could not have reasonable invest-
ment back expectations to develop the property as he wished. 54
The lack of reasonable investment backed expectations caused Pal-
azzolo's claim of a regulatory taking under Penn Central to fail.55
CONCLUSION
The Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that because
Palazzolo had neither sought permission to undertake less grandi-
ose plans nor applied for the subdivision that he claims was taken
from him, his claim was not ripe for review. Additionally, the court
found that substantial value still remains in Palazzolo's land de-
feating his claim of a per se regulatory takings claim. Palazzolo's
claim also failed under a Penn Central analysis because he never
had a reasonable investment backed expectation to develop a sev-
enty-four lot subdivision.
Michael J. Daly
48. See id.
49. See id. at 716.
50. See id.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 717.
53. See id.
54. See id.
55. See id.
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